Middle East in Flux
The ceasefire between Washington and Tehran has devolved into a high-stakes game of chicken rather than a path to a diplomatic resolution. Iran is maintaining control over the Strait of Hormuz, despite the US blockade, and Washington is probing how far it can push back without triggering a full-scale conflict. President Trump would seemingly prefer a diplomatic off-ramp, resisting escalation even after this week’s IRGC attacks on regional allies like the UAE, but Tehran is biding its time with negotiations, betting that it can raise the economic and military price of US presence enough to extract concessions along the way.
That’s why “Project Freedom”—the US-led effort to escort commercial shipping through the Strait—may have been a nonstarter. Despite the loss of much of its conventional navy, Iran remains capable of threatening merchant vessels using anti-ship missiles and cheap, fast attack craft. This has kept insurers and shipping firms from returning to the Strait in meaningful numbers. Meanwhile, gaps in the US naval blockade have allowed Iranian-linked vessels to continue transit using flags of convenience, solidifying Iran’s leverage at the negotiating table.
The regional security picture shows that space for neutrality is disappearing. Iran has renewed strikes against Gulf energy infrastructure, prompting Gulf states to personally invest in what had previously been a US-Israel military effort. The UAE is now conducting joint air patrols with US forces over the Strait, signaling preparations for sustained operations rather than de-escalation.
While the war might have started as a US-Israel battle against Iran, the battle has spread to the Gulf and wider region and as a consequence, the greater Middle East is fragmenting into opposing camps—those who favor continued pressure on Iran, such as Israel and UAE, and those seeking to contain the conflict before it widens, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan.
Emerging World (Dis)Order
The Pentagon announced it will withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany, to be completed over the next six to twelve months, but the timing suggests the move is tied to political tensions between Washinton and Berlin. After German Chancellor Friedrich Merz remarked that Iran is “humiliating” the US at the negotiating table last week, it didn’t take long for President Trump to make the announcement. Similar threats of troop withdrawal have been made to Italy and Spain.
This reinforces the perception that US troop deployments are being used as political leverage in the NATO alliance. Although it’s unclear where the withdrawn troops will be moved, this doesn’t look like a routine redeployment or an effort to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. For European leaders, the longstanding assumption that US military deployments in the country were insulated from short-term political disputes is now ruptured.
With Germany’s role as a central hub for US forces ostensibly uprooted, the gradual erosion of unconditional US security guarantees is forcing Europe into strategic autonomy. But that transition will take time—European commitments to increased defense spending, including long-term targets agreed within NATO frameworks, have a 2035 deadline. By contrast, US withdrawals can happen quickly. If the policy is extended to Italy and Spain—which together house over 15,000 US troops—the NATO alliance could see its deterrence credibility degraded far faster than European procurement timelines can compensate.
Weekly Wildcard
Vladimir Putin is reportedly concerned about both assassination attempts and elite defection—with former defense minister Sergei Shoigu reportedly identified as a potential destabilizing figure. Amidst growing paranoia, Russia’s Federal Protective Service has reportedly overhauled security protocols around senior leadership, increasing surveillance of officials and tightening movement and communications restrictions within the Kremlin.
The revelations coincide with Moscow’s announcement of a unilateral Victory Day ceasefire on May 9, paired with threats of large-scale missile strikes on central Kyiv should the celebrations be disrupted. This year, the Kremlin ordered a scaled-down parade omitting military hardware, likely out of concern that Ukraine could target the Red Square during proceedings. Internet access has also been cut across Moscow—signals of a regime concerned with internal intrusions and security concerns. A ceremony designed to project strength is instead being shaped by expectations of disruption.
Allegations about Shoigu remain ambiguous but consequential—recent intelligence reports suggest the Kremlin now sees him as a potential source of leaks and views his lingering influence in the army high command with suspicion. Whether that signals real coup risk or preemptive paranoia is uncertain, but as tension and internal strife crowd the Kremlin’s atmosphere, the Russian army suffered a net loss of Ukrainian territory in April for the first time since August 2024. Indeed, if Vladimir Putin’s focus continues to shift inward, fear of his own position and personal security could translate into reduced battlefield effectiveness.
