Emerging World (Dis)Order
The agreed upon Memorandum of Understanding coming out of the latest US-Iran negotiations is a validation of progress, but each signatory will interpret its requisite obligations in a way that advances its national interest. This will impact the speed and nature of the deal’s implementation and even threaten its ultimate viability.
The disagreement sits on the three fault lines that define whether this holds together at all—inspections at the damaged nuclear sites, the status of enriched material, and the future operating rules of the Strait of Hormuz. Last week, senior US officials were briefing that Iran had effectively accepted the return of international inspectors to facilities hit during the war. Iranian spokespeople immediately pushed back, insisting no such commitment had been made.
And after months of kinetic attacks throughout the Middle East, notably on Iran’s Gulf neighbors and a renewed fight between Israel and Hezbollah, the conflict is not limited to the US and Iran.
Israel’s next steps can still challenge the fragile agreement, though the IDF has begun limited withdrawals in Lebanon amidst continued low-level clashes with Hezbollah. A full withdrawal remains contingent on a credible Lebanese commitment to Hezbollah’s disarmament, which Israel currently sees as unlikely. Meanwhile, Tehran has tied nuclear talks with the US to Israel’s full withdrawal from the country, further complicating the calculus.
Tanker movements through Hormuz have climbed back to their highest levels since the conflict began, and maritime agencies are accelerating the return of stranded crews. LNG flows out of the Gulf are stabilizing faster than most models anticipated—though it’s worth mentioning that most of the renewed movement thus far is Chinese and Iranian. Commercial flows are re-forming on their own timetable, regardless of political ambiguity.
That disparity creates its own strategic opening. If maritime traffic normalizes while the legal framework remains contested, Tehran gains optionality. Iran won’t need to close the Strait outright to gain leverage in future talks. It only needs to impose friction—inspections, delays, administrative charges—that can be dialed up or down without crossing the threshold of open conflict. Once again, Iran is betting that once the US withdrawal is complete, Washington will lack the political will to re-engage.
Weekly Wildcard
In a sharp rebuke of President Gustavo Petro’s tenure, political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella has narrowly defeated Petro’s preferred candidate, Iván Cepeda, in Colombia’s presidential runoff, winning by less than one percentage point—around 250,000 votes out of more than 25 million cast. The result itself is no longer in question. Colombia’s rapid, centralized tabulation made the outcome effectively clear within hours of polls closing. What lingers is the political aftermath of how narrowly the country avoided a different outcome.
Although electoral authorities and international observers disagreed, President Petro was quick to circulate claims of electoral fraud, casting uncertainty on the result and raising the prospect of prolonged contestation and political violence. Iván Cepeda initially withheld a formal concession pending legal review and certification, but he has since conceded, mitigating the risk of violence but doing little to assuage the underlying tensions.
De la Espriella, who was notably endorsed by President Trump, enters office with a clearly defined political profile—fiscally conservative, security-first, and aligned with the regional figures such as Argentina’s Javier Milei and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele.
A central feature of his foreign policy outlook is closer alignment with Washington, particularly on counter-narcotics and intelligence sharing. That alignment implies deeper operational cooperation, including more direct US-supported targeting of high-value criminal actors, similar to recent cross-border counternarcotics actions carried out in coordination with local authorities in Venezuela against a major drug trafficking figure.
The narrow margin of victory underscores how deeply polarized Colombia remains. Despite de la Espriella’s hardline security rhetoric and his promises to restore fiscal discipline and attract foreign capital, he enters office facing a constrained political mandate and significant institutional friction. Translating campaign priorities into durable policy will require navigating a fragmented legislature and a complex security environment that is unlikely to yield quickly to top-down directives.
