In Other News – A View from Abroad – 1/12/2023

January 12, 2023

A view from Abroad
Once a month, In Other News features a short op-ed heavily informed by the European perspective. We hope that these special monthly pieces will offer our readers an enriched understanding of global events and allow for a more robust international risk calculus.

Economic security and strategic autonomy should unite the EU and Washington, not divide us. There’s an active European conversation happening right now regarding economics, trade, and investment, and it’s closely linked to broader debates about the future of European security. The pandemic, Russian attack on Ukraine, and increase of China’s international assertiveness, have all collided to compel the EU member states to enhance their economic security and re-envision strategic autonomy. But while the concepts of economic security and strategic autonomy partially overlap and are often used interchangeably in the current European political discourse, EU policy decisions and relations with the United States will be strengthened if they’re treated as distinct goals.

Economic security can be defined as protecting the most important activities in the economy, like defending technological innovations, securing novel research from intellectual espionage, making supply chains more robust, countering cyber threats, and scrutinizing foreign takeovers in strategic sectors. On most of these dimensions, EU member states are up to speed and have taken many concrete steps to make improvements throughout the past year.

Strategic autonomy, however, focuses more on reducing external dependencies of European governments, companies, and societies. To make this happen, Europe needs to be able produce its own strategic goods and should maintain adequate supplies. This is a greater challenge, but one that can be met with increased economic alliances. The immediate need for strategic autonomy has led to intense discussions among EU member states, and Brussels has now broadened the concept to an “open” strategic autonomy, presenting an opportunity for enhanced collaboration with the United States.

While the EU is rightly working on a plan to increase its strategic autonomy, there are some structural obstacles that need to be overcome so that outside allies can be included. The draft European Chips Act that aims to strengthen the European semiconductor industry is promising, but further operationalization, like in the ‘trusted cloud’ initiative, quantum tech and Artificial Intelligence, remains a challenge. Advancements in these areas are stymied by the division of competencies between the EU in Brussels and its member states, which is more convoluted than in the economic security domain.

Further, while European discussions on strategic autonomy mirror those of Washington, the allies’ strategies aren’t always aligned to an optimal degree. For example, the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has real economic implications for Europe and comes at an important moment. But the EU isn’t exactly sure how it will be impacted by the package, and it’s scrambling to secure its position.

European Council President Michel has called for a special session in mid-February to discuss how the IRA will impact the European economy and ensure, among other goals, that European companies get exemptions from the IRA, like companies in Canada and Mexico do. Michel has also requested that the European Commission prepare a package of instruments to support the competitiveness of European business, indicating concern about the potential of the IRA to distort fair competition.

Trade conflicts and competition fears among Western democracies, especially pertaining to their relations with China, threaten the kind of global security we need moving forward. The United States is understandably working to protect its competitive position by limiting the export of advanced technology to China, controlling foreign takeovers, and better promoting its economic interests like with semiconductors and clean technology. But to prevent a subsidy war, this calls for a form of cooperation between the EU and the Washington that’s greater than the current agreement to inform each other– especially on the financing side.

While NATO has proven an excellent forum for allied dialogue and joint decision making on foreign policy and defense issues, an equivalent forum in the economic sphere is lacking. Modernization, reform and revitalization of the World Trade Organization, expansion of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council and more frequent G7 meetings could help address this gap. Memories of Cocom which regulated strategic exports to the Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War springs to mind as the kind of innovative policy thinking that the current circumstances demand.

Indeed, China and Russia would only profit from disagreement, competition or even conflict between the established democracies of the world on the economic front. And there’s no better time for enhanced economic cooperation between the EU and Washington. With better coordination, based on agreed international rules on trade, the West and allies can make sure not to play into the hand of autocratic competitors.

In Other News – The Geopolitical Landscape heading into 2023 – 1/4/2023

January 4, 2023

As we head into 2023, it’s a good a moment to acknowledge that the world is in the thick of a significant geopolitical shift, and many key drivers of our collective future are in flux. Having a comprehensive understanding of what is at stake, and what levers for action exist, will be essential for strategic decision-making in the coming year. Below, The Arkin Group shares some of the central geopolitical themes to consider while navigating the new and evolving world order.

Putin Will Persist, But Ukraine Will Continue to Prevail
As Russia continues its relentless winter assault on Ukraine, Putin must also manage an increasingly disenfranchised, underequipped and untrained military force, as well as an economy under pressure from enduring sanctions. And if we learned anything in 2022, it’s that while Putin is still hoping for a victory, Ukrainian resilience is an indomitable force. NATO, its member states, and its allies are all working to supply Kyiv with ever more sophisticated weaponry to resist and reclaim lost territory. Many see the makings of a stalemate, likening Eastern Ukraine to the 37th parallel, but the forces working against Putin both on the battlefield and the domestic front will eventually erode Russian resolve and capability to continue in Ukraine. The recent offers for peace negotiations are a tacit acknowledgement that Russia has no real options other than to continue the war. Though that doesn’t mean that Putin won’t persist to his continued detriment.

The Stability of the Global Order is at Play on the Front Lines in Ukraine.
Russia’s invasion has had a global inflationary effect as energy and food prices soar, supply chains are disrupted, and instability disrupts the global economic recovery from the pandemic. But even more critically, whether Putin is able to successfully invade and occupy an independent, sovereign country will have lasting impact on the legitimacy and strength on the global international order. If Ukraine is usurped, what next for the Baltic States and Poland? And what fate for Taiwan? There are countless lingering territorial disputes that could explode into conflict if countries believe that they will not be held to account for violating a longstanding international norm for the respect of territorial integrity.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine also rightly prompted a rapid acceleration to advance alternative energy not only for environmental but security purposes. Concurrent to this development, we have made a critical advancement in nuclear fusion technology. These developments have laid out a clear path to a carbon-free future. Still, the intermediary resurgence of coal as a stopgap solution to a shortage of Russian supply as well as ever-increasing reports of severe weather, flooding, and water scarcity underscore the fact that we need to work faster.

Russia and China’s Autocratic Missteps have created a real opportunity for the West and Democratic Allies.
NATO’s renewed sense of purpose and commitment to investing in our common security will be a lasting and welcome trend from 2022. Putin’s blunder, along with China’s continual and repeated missteps in handling Covid-19, have shown the world how the even purportedly efficiently run autocracies are inherently sclerotic. Information flows are greatly impacted by fears of reprisal for speaking truth to power. The healthy debate that is critical for decision making in matters of national security and crisis management are impossible in societies where there is absolute control in one decision maker. This summer, Xi cemented his hold on power for the foreseeable future echoing Putin’s deft maneuverings a decade hence making us nostalgic for the erstwhile decision-making bodies of the Soviet Politburo and the previous iterations of the People’s Party’s Congress, which were more stable and predictable because there was more than one set of opinions. Turkey’s Erdogan and Saudi Arabia’s MBS should take note.

The rest of the world – the Global South in particular — is looking for leadership and alternatives to the offerings of these autocracies. The change in global dynamics have opened a variety of opportunities to the West whether it be the U.S. leveraging China’s faltering Belt and Road initiative to make overtures to Africa and the Global South more generally, or the recognized importance for businesses to divest or at the very least diversify their supply chain away from China. The West needs to continue to seek our diplomatic and economic partnerships with countries in Africa and Latin Africa, which are considered critical suppliers of key minerals and rare earths, to counter China’s decades-long courting. If viable economic and political opportunities can be provided to countries like Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere as companies look for alternative production sites to China, and the U.S. seeks to create a security corridor in South China Sea, then more global consensus will emerge for this new path.

Good Governance is a Matter of Global Security
And if the world needed more examples of the nefarious effects of undemocratic societies, the tragic and heartbreaking stories (often away from the headlines) from Afghanistan and Iran show how dangerous autocratic rule can be, especially to women. It also demonstrates how inherently unstable these societies are. Another challenge was highlighted by Qatar’s skillful manipulation of FIFA and now the emergent scandal of its influence campaign targeting the European Parliament – but this was just the most recent and flagrant display of the greatest vulnerabilities in our open society. The revelations of the Panama Papers, the Paradise Papers and the Pandora Papers – in addition to the raft of sanctions against Russia and Putin’s Oligarchs – have made compliance a real challenge to global corporations as we realize how dirty money penetrates the whole of our global economic system. Mitigating corruption is essential to managing the emergent reality of enormous wealth inequality across the whole of the global economy, and to ensuring security and the rule of law so that individuals and corporations have recourse to justice.

Good Corporate Tech Governance is a Matter of Global Security
Microsoft and StarLink have delivered extraordinary and definitive support to the war in Ukraine. When Elon Musk tweeted the outlines of Putin’s peace agreement suggesting it was a reasonable path, it affected the debate and demonstrated how tech billionaires are now overtly influencing both climate policy and foreign policy. The fallout from the egregious scandals of FTX, Nikola Motors, and Theranos have resulted in billions of investor losses. These events — along with our growing awareness that Facebook can be an effective disinformation tool for election interference and TikTok a deleterious tool for our collection ability to concentrate as well as a huge threat to privacy– added to our understanding of the inherent perils imbedded in the growing influence of tech firms. These tech companies now have a level of influence on par with certain countries or certain international institutions, and it is a troubling thing to posit that our security, election integrity, and enduring privacy and freedom are dependent on the whims of these entities.

Good Intelligence is Critical
If there is one overarching lesson to take from 2022 into 2023, it’s that nothing can be done without good information and analysis. It was the excellent U.S. intelligence that foretold the Russian invasion and allowed Kyiv and the West to organize. But it was also our overestimation of the Russian capability and underestimation of the Ukrainian capacity for resistance that complicated our readiness. On the other hand, Russia completely botched its assessment of Ukrainian opposition to the invasion and misread Western commitment to Ukrainian security. Yet another example to highlight is that, as we head into a third year of complications from the covid pandemic, visibility into China remains limited. Because press coverage is stifled and even the local provincial governments are incentivized to only report what the central government wants to hear, reliable sources are scarce and unbiased assessments even more scant.

To make calculated decisions in the coming year, it’s necessary to understand the entrenched effects of China’s Belt and Road initiative and the Wagner Group’s actions in Africa, which can only be acquired through local collection and sound regional expertise. Another area of strategic ambiguity is that there appears to be yet another Pink-ish or Leftist Tide moving across Latin America, with the shifts in leadership in Brazil, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Peru, but political stability seems generally more tenuous as governments grapple with crippling economic pressures.

Navigating this rapidly evolving environment means understanding what’s really going on, perhaps even in some cases on a street-by-street level. There is real volatility in the world today and the evolution of the varying dynamics that will drive these geopolitical realities is rapid and often counterintuitive. First and foremost, good intelligence will allow governments and companies to effectively traverse these uncertain waters. In the private sector in particular, corporations need to invest heavily in their capability to collect and understand intelligence that will provide them with the wherewithal to make critical strategic decisions.

In Other News – A View from Abroad – 12/8/2022

December 8, 2022

A view from abroad
Once a month, In Other News features a short op-ed heavily informed by the European perspective. We hope that these special monthly pieces will offer our readers an enriched understanding of global events and allow for a more robust international risk calculus.

Turkey: Ally or Spoiler
As Ukraine continues to defend itself valiantly against Russia’s relentless attack, Turkey increasingly finds itself pulled between two worlds. Because of its longstanding geopolitical connections to both NATO members and Russia, Turkey’s response to the war can have an outsized impact. But in addition to external demands, Ankara must manage its own social, political, and economic challenges. Given this complex operating environment, the West should make it known that Turkey is valued as an ally.

Turkey is dealing with substantial foreign and domestic policy challenges that include ongoing tensions with the Kurds, Armenia, Greece, and other regional players. Further complicating matters, in recent years Turkey’s relations with the EU have been strained by conflicting views on Turkey’s accession status, human rights record, and policies vis a vis Turkish-born EU citizens. Ankara’s relations with the United States have also been challenged by the perceived reaction to the 2016 failed coup d’état attempt, acquisition of Russian air defense systems, and US cooperation with Kurdish groups in northern Syria.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine last February, Turkey has supported NATO’s political position, delivered weapons to Ukraine, closed the Bosphorus to Russian warships passing through, and helped arrange the grain deal. But it has also refused to apply EU/UK/US sanctions, profited from cheap energy deliveries from Russia, and harbored many illicit Russian oligarch yachts. Turkey has further tried to leverage Finnish and Swedish bids to become NATO members, asking for more PKK-related gestures from Sweden before it would ratify the memberships. And notably, Erdogan continues to engage directly with Putin.

An element of personal pride and insecurity can be seen in Erdogan’s politics. Since assuming national leadership roles nearly 20 years ago, Erdogan has consistently made Turkey less democratic, more Islamist and more authoritarian. But because he has removed institutional stabilizers, like the independence of the Central Bank, Turkey is suffering from rampant inflation and both monetary and economic crises. Next year, Erdogan faces elections, 100 years after the Republic of Turkey was founded, and he will be judged in large part by Turkey’s domestic economy.

In his foreign policy, Erdogan has become distrustful of traditional anchors such as the bid for EU membership and the NATO alliance. He hopes to exploit the geographical position of Turkey, between East and West, between the European and the Arab world, to the maximum extent possible. But he can be a tough-minded operator in the process. Erdogan has flooded the EU with refugees and overlooked the conflict with Saudi Arabia on MBS and the brutal killing of Jamal Khashoggi.

But ultimately, Erdogan is a transactional and pragmatic actor who will respond to incentives, and the West cannot afford to lose Turkey as an ally. At a fragmented time, it would be better if NATO and allies can link arms deliveries to Turkey’s ratification of the NATO accession treaties of Sweden and Finland and connect economic cooperation and aid programs to cooperation mitigating refugee flows.

Further, if Erdogan wants to be viewed by Washington with the same clout as his western neighbors, there’s an opportunity for Turkey to use its strategic position to further the cooperative mission of the newly formed European Political Community- a more structured security dialogue with the EU and bilateral engagement by its individual member states.

In Other News – Russia, China, and Opportunities for the US – 12/2/2022

December 2, 2022

Russia is trying to wear us down, but it’s wearing itself down in the process. Russian airstrikes have caused immense damage to the power grid in Ukraine, and this week President Zelenskyy has asserted that Putin is trying “to turn the cold of winter into a weapon of mass destruction.” Ukrainian officials have stated that rolling blackouts could continue until March and that citizens should prepare for long periods of shutdown. Russia is angling to wear Ukraine down, but he’s also hoping to wear down European resolve against him.

According to the head of the Norwegian Refugee Council, European nations should prepare to receive hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians over the winter as the living conditions become untenable. But with their own housing shortages compounded by inflation, high energy prices, and social discontent, welcoming refugees will be a challenge for many governments. Putin knows this, and he also knows that Europe is nearing its challenging December 5 cut-off date for Russian oil imports.

But this week, NATO members met in Romania and reiterated that Ukraine is eligible for NATO membership and that the alliance will continue to send more financial, humanitarian, and military aid to Ukrainian forces. Ukraine’s membership process will be set aside for now to maintain firm unity of NATO members during this time of immediate crisis. Secretary of State Blinken also announced that the US government will provide over $53 million to support Ukraine’s acquisition of critical electricity grid equipment over the winter, and NATO ministers further vowed to help rebuild Ukraine once the war is over.

Russia is also increasingly facing its own internal challenges. Although the immediate impact of sanctions can be debated, sanctions are a marathon not a sprint, and we’re entering higher mileage territory. Sanctions have also demonstrated the resolve of NATO and allies to stand up to Putin and made his technological and military procurements more difficult. Putin must also continue to justify the food and energy crises and the general negative economic impact of the war to his allies, who are probably growing tired of his tropes. Further, internal dissent in Russia continues to rise, and as more bodies are sent home disapproval will only increase.

China, soccer and soft power and an opportunity for the United States. Over the last 50 or so years, China has constructed and renovated hundreds of sports stadiums worldwide as part of its soft power diplomacy. China started the effort in neighboring Mongolia but has since built numerous facilities throughout Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and South Pacific. The Chinese understood the power of sports and have used construction efforts to their political advantage. The stadiums were commonly “gifted” by the Chinese to countries as a reward for cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Other times, nations would shift their stance on Taiwan after receiving the “gifts.”

Over the years, the stadium construction, along with other soft power initiatives, has allowed China to gain more political support from countries in places like Latin America and Africa. Stadiums are relatively affordable and offer big payoffs in terms of happiness. The symbolic camaraderie has also permitted China with an inroad to other lucrative infrastructure projects in these regions and allowed China to become a top trading partner for multiple continents.

But China is now slowing economically and facing a rare degree of internal turmoil due to its inhumane Covid policies, among other things. At the recent Chinese National Congress, President Xi scarcely mentioned the Belt and Road Initiative and it’s likely that instead of gifting stadiums, China will need to focus on supporting industries that directly impact its own citizens – things like copper, petroleum, and soybeans. At the same time, many Belt and Road countries will begin to see the underside of their Chinese infrastructure projects: public debt. Under these circumstances, there’s an opportunity for the United States to develop and reignite key relationships in strategic places like Latin America to counter China’s influence.

In Other News – Russia is Officially to Blame for the Malaysia Air Tragedy – 11/23/2022

November 23, 2022

Despite rampant disinformation, Russia is officially to blame for the Malaysia Air tragedy. This is another example of Moscow’s ongoing campaign to distort facts and shape global politics. Last week, a Dutch court handed life sentences to two Russian men and a pro-Moscow Ukrainian for their involvement in shooting down a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet as it was flying over eastern Ukraine in 2014. Notably, the jet was shot down over separatist-controlled Donetsk six months into Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. The commercial airliner was hit by a Russian surface-to-air missile, killing all 298 people aboard, and Moscow was quick to muddy the waters of attribution. Anyone following the story closely, however, knew that Russia was likely responsible, and the recent convictions are a step towards justice.

At the time of the tragedy, the Kremlin made claims that the airliner had shifted course, that the missile had the signature of an outdated missile that Russia no longer used, and that video of the surface to air missile showed the rocket launcher being in Ukrainian occupied territory. The Russian media carried contradictory alternative stories that a surface to air missile was not actually the cause of the crash. The maneuvering of the disinformation narrative by Russia, combined with a rapidly shifting political situation in the region, replaced international outrage with profound confusion and at the time allowed the Kremlin to avoid the rightful amount of condemnation.

But robust open source-based investigations by groups like Bellingcat and Paris Match and the Ukrainian military were able to quickly piece together the true story. These investigators had technology on their side, and they were able to track the movement of the Buk Missile launcher from Russia, through Donetsk and to the missile site. They identified the burned field where the missile was launched from, triangulated the place of impact from the flight course, the crash site and the missile launching location, and ultimately dispelled much of the Russian misinformation.

And still, it took eight years for Russia to be held publicly accountable for the downing of the flight and for the world to see Russian culpability writ large. In similar fashion, since the summer of 2016, the US has been providing compelling information of Russian election interference attempts and disinformation campaigns to meddle in internal affairs of elections in the United States, Ukraine, and many other EU nations. These Russian efforts include conducting cyber-attacks, spreading disinformation, funding pro-Russian parties and coup-plotting.

These attempts have been vehemently denied by Russia despite a growing preponderance of evidence, until earlier this month when the head of the Wagner Group and financier of the infamous IRA disinformation troll farm, Yevgeny Prigozhin decided to publicly remark that “We have interfered [in US elections], we are interfering, and we will continue to interfere. Carefully, accurately, surgically and in our own way, as we know how to do.”

Indeed, in addition to the grinding battlefield in Ukraine, the information war is actively being fought, especially in the global South, where false Russian narratives abound. Cybersecurity firms have also identified Russian attempts to interfere in the US Midterm Elections, often propagating the message that the US is “wasting money” by supporting Ukraine. But like with the Malaysia airline findings, Ukraine’s efforts to take detailed account of Russian war crimes even while mid-battle will ultimately serve to demonstrate Moscow’s concerted attempts to distort reality.

In Other News – Global Leaders Raise Need for Ukraine-Russia Peace Talks – 11/17/2022

November 17, 2022

Global leaders increasingly raise the need for Ukraine-Russia peace talks, but the reality on the battlefield indicates that we’re months away from meaningful concessions that would form the basis of a realistic peace agreement. On Tuesday, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy outlined his nation’s ten-fold formula for peace to the participants of the G20 summit in Bali. The plan centers on the premise that Ukraine should not have to comprise on issues of sovereignty, territory, independence, and conscience. Zelenskyy also called for discussions on peace to be public and not in closed rooms. Understandably, Ukrainian distrust of Russia reigns large, and Zelenskyy also emphasized that there “will be no Minsk-3” because Moscow would immediately violate such an agreement.

Most members of the G20 strongly condemned the war and agreed that Russia violated territorial sovereignty, but assessments of the situation and the impact of sanctions on the global economy were reportedly disputed. At the end of the G20 summit, however, French President Macron stated that he wants to visit Beijing in the coming year and aims to encourage China to take on a mediating role in the conflict. Turkey is also hoping to capitalize on its negotiating position and wants to build on its diplomatic efforts negotiating the grain deal.

But on Tuesday, while peace talks were being floated, Russia reportedly conducted the largest number of strikes in a single day since the initial week of its invasion last February. The intensity of the attacks is highly significant even as Ukraine claims some victories in places like Kherson. Russia continues to target power generation and transmission facilities, and on Thursday gas production plants and civilian buildings near the southern city of Zaporizhzhia were hit, resulting in several deaths and significant power cuts. Zelenskyy accused Putin of decimating civilian access to heat and electricity, but Moscow blames Kyiv for its “unwillingness” to negotiate. Russian officials also incredulously insisted that the US and NATO should take the blame for this week’s missile incident in Poland that killed two, as Washington is the “prime cause” of everything that’s happened.

Global pressures are mounting to negotiate an end to the war that’s been threatening stability well beyond Ukrainian borders, but so far Ukraine’s resolve remains strong, and Russia’s actions leave little evidence of winding-down. As stated by Kremlin spokesman Peskov, who was asked this week about the millions of Ukrainians left without power as winter temperatures take hold, “The special military operation continues and its continuation does not depend on climatic, weather conditions.” Peskov’s statement demonstrates Russia’s willingness to promote its war effort at all costs, and it also indicates that any real peace discussion is unlikely until both sides reassess their standing after the cold, winter months.

In Other News – A View from Abroad – the Nuclear Issue – 11/10/2022

November 10, 2022

A View from Abroad – the Nuclear Issue
Once a month, In Other News features a short op-ed heavily informed by the European perspective. We hope that these special monthly pieces will offer our readers an enriched understanding of global events and allow for a more robust international risk calculus.

The nuclear dimension in European foreign policy is back. Over the past 30 years, after intense debates on nuclear proliferation in the eighties, the nuclear threat in Europe gratefully retreated into the background. Out of the spotlight, the polarization of the previous decades disappeared, and nuclear arms control and disarmament treaties were updated and often concluded. European cooperation with Russia and China on non-proliferation, like with DPRK and Iran, even seemed possible. The existence of nuclear weapons was glazed over with opaque phrases such as ‘NATO as a nuclear alliance’, without an active understanding of what the stakes for using those weapons might be. Instead, leaders paid frequent lip-service to the greater aim of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: full nuclear disarmament.

But with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and Putin’s subsequent nuclear saber-rattling and continued rhetoric – including his unfounded allegations about a Ukrainian dirty bomb – the nuclear threat is now again at the forefront of NATO’s calculus. European leaders are suddenly reacquainting themselves with the language, logic, and inherent dilemmas of nuclear weapons: Mutually Assured Destruction, deterrence, nuclear posture, strategic balance, and strategic ambiguity. This includes an assessment of leaving the opponent unsure of if, when, and how the West would react to Russia using nuclear weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine, and the unspoken acknowledgement of the presence of US nuclear weapons on European soil.

Washington addresses some of these questions in its latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in its unclassified version in October. In line with previous versions, the latest NPR lists deterrence as the top priority and emphasizes that “The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners.” But the report also maintains that “nuclear weapons are required to deter not only nuclear attack, but also a narrow range of other high consequence, strategic-level attacks.” The stated policy aims to “complicate an adversary’s entire decision calculus” and seemingly acknowledges the multiple variables impacting a nation’s decision about if and how to conduct an attack.

European leaders are also trying to navigate how to respond to the heightened nuclear threat level. In October, Josep Borrell, Foreign Affairs head of the EU, stated that the West’s answer to a potential Russia nuclear attack on Ukraine will not be with nuclear weapons, and French President Macron made a similar comment. These statements could lower the bar for Putin’s use of nuclear weapons, since they diminish the threat of nuclear retaliation and blur the red line for Moscow not to use them. Finland and Sweden, however, recognized the shifting geopolitical reality sparked by Russia’s attack, and they moved to join NATO as a nuclear alliance. Signing the Nuclear Ban treaty has consequently become impossible for these two new NATO members.

The current reality incited by the Russia-Ukraine war is bleak. But when the conflict is finally over, and international relations are allowed some return to normalcy, the crucial international treaties and institutions in the nuclear domain, such as Start I and II, INF, Open Skies, Nuclear Suppliers Group, IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, will need to be revived. European politicians can be bolstered by a collective effort to be consistent, rational and engage in non-emotional decision making on nuclear issues. Their choice of messaging will also be critical, as political signaling can readily influence the other side’s mental calculus and inform the global response. But regardless of how exactly they reshape their policies, European leaders can no longer exclude or view the nuclear threat as immaterial– no matter what choices Putin ultimately makes.

In Other News – Global Leaders Confront a New Energy Reality – 11/4/2022

November 4, 2022

As the United Nations COP27 approaches, global leaders confront a new energy reality that’s been heavily influenced by the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the onset of the war last February, the issue of energy security has become a top priority for almost every nation. For some Russian allies like China and India, the sudden availability of Russian energy supplies at a discounted rate has been welcomed, while EU nations and allies have scrambled to secure alternate supplies due to sanctions. Other nations, like Lebanon and Israel, have forged unlikely deals to exploit fossil fuel resources and get in on the action. OPEC+ members are trying to capitalize on the high demand and uncertain future while simultaneously managing political expectations. And all of this has been happening in the backdrop of an increased global awareness to reduce fossil fuel usage and emissions.

The Russia-Ukraine war has temporarily pushed both the emissions and climate financing commitments that were made last November at COP26 to the backburner. Understandably, national leaders have prioritized keeping the heat on and the industry going, regardless of the desire to curb emissions, and we’ve seen a lot of stop-gap measures put into place. Coal has reemerged as an energy source in places where it was being phased out. Nuclear energy is also being reassessed as a viable option, as are a myriad of alternative energy options like solar and wind. Indeed, the war has made a real case for renewables and is accelerating their development. But greener options aren’t yet affordable, cost-effective, or robust enough, and at the upcoming COP27 in Egypt next week, leaders will be challenged to commit to lowering emissions given the geopolitical and economic constraints.

For more than two decades, the UN COPs have been the forum for international negotiations on climate change. In 2015, the gathering led to the Paris Agreement that is still viewed as a fundamental benchmark by most nations today. But more recently, discussion about which nations should be responsible for funding the energy transition has taken center stage.

Notably, the upcoming COP is being held in Africa – a region with low emissions contributions but highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change. Leaders of developed nations will come face-to-face with their failure to live up to the climate financing promises they made at COP26. Measures to curb inflation will further complicate the discussion. African leaders sitting on fossil fuel resources might also try to reconcile climate commitments with their right to, and need for, economic development, particularly as food supply chains and access remain threatened.

In addition to fossil fuels, the emerging resource battle is with the global south and developing economies that are rich in minerals and rare earth elements that will likely power the next phase of economic and technological development. Russia and China have already made significant investments and inroads in parts of Africa, and national policies are likely to be dictated by these economic relationships. Indeed, COP27 arrives at a time when energy, economics, and politics frequently have opposing needs, and it’s looking increasingly difficult to satisfy them all.

In Other News – All Evidence Suggests Putin Remains Undeterred in Ukraine – 10/27/2022

October 27, 2022

Despite Russian setbacks on the ground, all evidence suggests that Vladimir Putin remains undeterred in Ukraine. From the onslaught of Russian missiles targeting critical infrastructure to running nuclear drills in response to the completely unverified intelligence that Ukraine is trying to build a dirty bomb, Putin’s new war posture is geared to grind down both Ukrainian and Western resolve for his unjust war. As Autumn progresses, Putin hopes to shroud the Ukrainian people in darkness and cold and cause enormous strain to American and European political leaders with high gas prices and the threat of nuclear fallout and hoping that the U.S. midterm elections might turn a result more amenable to his worldview. He is hoping that the West might start to negotiate for themselves and not Ukraine to end their own pain.

The winter will be very hard, Ukraine has rolling blackouts and water supplies to key cities, like Mykolaiv, are now unsecured. Ukraine has directed its displaced refugees not to return to Ukraine until after the winter. European leaders are reaching on a consensus for a price cap on Russian energy as Russian energy flows are steadily being cut and still prices in Europe are soaring. Also, the coming months will reveal the results of the massive Russian mobilization, whether some of the purported 300,000 newly conscripted Russian troops can successfully be redeployed to overwhelm Ukrainian forces despite the apparent and serious logistical, tactical, political, and social challenges to do so.

Just as staving off Russia’s access to elements essential to microchip production has been key to the sanctions effort, ensured access to technology has become central to sustaining Ukraine’s war effort as evidenced by the hectic effort to ensure continuation of Elon Musk’s Starlink service following his parroting of Russian talking points on many social media and public forums. Precision guided missile systems require satellite links and communication with the field. There is general consensus that one of the major key success factors to staving off Russian cyber attacks has been the longtime investment of Microsoft in Ukraine. Furthermore, drones and the novel use of AI have been integral to Ukraine’s effective, asymmetrical battle strategy.

Russia understands this too as evidenced by Russian Foreign Ministry official Konstantin Vorontsov statements at the UN declaring that Russia will consider commercial satellites belonging to the U.S. and it’s Allies legitimate military targets if they are used to support the Ukrainian war effort. As the war drags on, technology and innovation more generally may be the crux upon which Ukraine resistance will need to be leveraged in response to continuing Russian devastation.

Unfazed by Putin’s nuclear blackmail, NATO continued to run its “Steadfast Noon” war games, which test airborne nuclear forces but with no live-fire elements, in Belgium, the UK and over the North Sea. Attention presently is focused on providing Ukraine with the anti-missile defenses its needs as well as the financial support required to sustain living conditions in Ukraine. For now, NATO and its partners are galvanized both by Ukraine’s military success on the ground but also by the clear understanding that European and Western security is inextricably linked to Ukrainian victory. In fact discussion this week in Germany on funding the Ukrainian rebuild focused more on the importance of funding the Ukrainian war effort.

In Other News – Iranian Weapons in Russia Reveal Putin’s Limitations – 10/21/2022

October 21, 2022

Iranian weapons in Russia reveal Putin’s needs and limitations, geopolitical realignments abound. This week, Tehran’s relationship with Moscow made headlines after Ukraine accused Russia of using Iranian-made drones to attack Kyiv and stated that Ukrainian air defenses have shot down over 200 Iranian-made drones in the past few weeks. US Intelligence officials also reported that Iranian military personnel were in Crimea in the capacity of drone trainers and tech support workers after the Russian military suffered “operator and system failures early on” in its attempts to effectively use the weapons.

Tehran has publicly denied the accusation of selling Iranian weapons to Russia, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman even had the audacity to offer “dialogue and negotiation with Ukraine to clear these allegations”. The Kremlin, unsurprisingly, has also denied use of the Iranian equipment. Meanwhile, US Intelligence officials are concerned that Russia isn’t going to limit its purchases to Iranian drones but could be trying to buy surface-to-surface missiles from Tehran. In early September, the US Treasury’s OFAC designated a Tehran-based air transportation service and several Iranian corporate entities for the involvement in supplying drones to Russia, and it’s likely that more sanctions are to come.

Iran and Russia, in addition to sharing the false narrative that the West is an instigator that’s responsible for their immense social and economic problems, have prior on-the-ground experience collaborating on the battlefield. Although the Moscow-Tehran relationship is long marked by competition and opportunism, the nations can work together well enough when there’s common interest. Of note, many of the same Iranian and Russian leaders involved in securing a 2015 bilateral agreement on military-technical cooperation between the two nations are still involved in government and military leadership positions today.

While that deal was designed to coordinate operations in Syria, which they did, over the years personal relationships have developed, and the nations have collaborated on sanctions evasion and other energy initiatives. Tehran also knows that Russia won’t criticize its leaders for violently curbing internal dissent, which has been steady ever since 22 year-old Iranian Mahsa Amini recently died in the hands of the government after being arrested for wearing her hijab improperly. And Tehran can also depend on Russia to threaten Israel with retaliation if Israel moves to supply Kyiv’s military with technology or weapons.

But as much as the Iranian drone revelation reveals about Moscow’s relations with Tehran, we can also learn a lot from what we’re not seeing. That the Russians needed to resort to Iranian-made weapons indicates that they’re not getting what they might have wanted from China, which has been a concern since the onset of the war. Thus far, Beijing has primarily supported Russia by parroting the Kremlin’s propaganda and refusing to condemn Putin in the international arena. Beijing has also maintained essential economic dealings with Moscow, often price gouging Putin in the process, yet China’s been careful to avoid violating certain sanctions and Russia’s tech needs have been hurt in response.

China’s also been creeping into traditional Russian turf while Putin’s been distracted looking west. Central Asian countries, who typically look to Russia as a regional negotiator have taken advantage of Russia’s weakness to express their grievances about Moscow and hold independent meetings with China. Beijing has also invested billions in regional infrastructure development and has paid special attention to deepening relations with Kazakhstan- a key regional actor that borders both China and Russia. While Russia has traditionally played policeman and ensured that even unpopular regional leaders were able to maintain their positions, it’s also true that over a year since Taliban control of Afghanistan other Central Asian nations haven’t seen an increased threat or needed Moscow’s protection.

With multiple variables clearly at play, we can anticipate traditional regional allies testing the waters, and enemies finding areas of opportunity. The same week that Iran was making headlines for the drones, an advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader proclaimed that Saudi Arabia and Iran should reopen their embassies to solve their problems “in a better way.” Indeed, the geopolitical order that was initially rocked back in February continues to actively evolve and shape political strategy in the greater region.